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Abstract. In this paper, we present a novel approach to cloud service security 
certification. This approach could be used to: (a) define and execute automati-
cally certification models, which can continuously and incrementally acquire 
and analyse evidence regarding the provision of services on cloud infrastruc-
tures through continuous monitoring; (b) use this evidence to assess whether the 
provision is compliant with required security properties; and (c) generate and 
manage digital certificates confirming the compliance of services if the ac-
quired evidence supports this. We also present the results of an initial experi-
mental evaluation of our approach based on the MySQL server and RUBiS 
benchmark. 
1 Introduction 
Cloud technology offers a powerful approach to the provision of infrastructure, plat-
form and software services without incurring a considerable cost of owning, operating 
and maintaining the computational infrastructures required for this purpose. However, 
despite being cost effective, this technology has raised concerns regarding the securi-
ty, privacy, governance and compliance of the data and software services offered 
through it. This is due to the fact that the internals of service provision are not visible 
to service consumers, and service providers are reluctant to take full responsibility for 
the security of services that they offer through clouds, and accept liability for security 
breaches [2]. In such circumstances, there is a trust deficit that needs to be addressed.  
The potential of certification as a means of addressing the lack of trust regarding 
the security of different types of software (and hardware) systems, including the 
cloud, has been widely recognised [19]. However, the recognition of this potential has 
not led to as a wide adoption as it was expected originally. The reason for this is that 
certification has traditionally been carried out through standards and certification 
schemes (e.g., ISO27001 [19], ISO27002 [19] and Common Criteria [7]), which in-
volve predominantly manual systems security auditing, testing and inspection pro-
cesses. Such processes tend to be lengthy and have a significant financial cost, which 
often prevents new and smaller technology vendors from adopting it [11]. 
The certification of cloud services is not an exception to this overall trend. On the 
contrary, most of the existing certification schemes (e.g., STAR [27] and OCF [8]) are 
not fit-for-purpose for the certification of cloud services. This is due to several rea-
sons. Firstly, current schemes offer no automation and can only support certification 
at distinct time points without considering the continuum of service provision be-
tween these points. Secondly, they produce certificates based on testing without in-
corporating real and continuous cloud service monitoring. Finally, they cannot sup-
port dynamic changes in the structure, deployment and configuration of the systems 
and data that underpin the provision of cloud services as, for example, the dynamic 
migration of data and software components across different computational nodes 
within a cloud infrastructure or a cloud federation. 
In this paper, we present a novel approach to cloud service certification. This ap-
proach can be used to: (a) define and execute automatically certification models, 
which can continuously and incrementally acquire and analyse evidence regarding the 
provision of services on cloud infrastructures through continuous monitoring; (b) use 
this evidence to assess whether the provision is compliant with required security 
properties; and (c) generate and manage digital certificates confirming the compliance 
of services if the acquired evidence supports this. Our approach has been developed 
as part of the EU R&D project CUMULUS and has been implemented as part of the 
prototype certification infrastructure of it [10]. An early account of our approach was 
introduced in [18] and examples of different types of certification models based on it 
have been presented in [17] and [16]. In this paper, we present an advanced version of 
our approach, incorporating an elaborated scheme for: (i) assessing the sufficiency of 
evidence for producing certificates and (ii) executing certification processes according 
to precisely defined models of them. We also present the results of an initial experi-
mental evaluation of our approach. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
CUMULUS approach to certification. Section 3, 4 and 5 describe three key ingredi-
ents of the certification models that drive the certification process in CUMULUS, i.e., 
the specification of security properties, the specification of the evidence assessment 
scheme in such models and the specification of the certification process model, re-
spectively. Section 6 discusses the results of an initial experimental evaluation of our 
approach. Finally, Section 7 reviews related work and Section 6 summarizes our ap-
proach and provides directions for future work. 
2 Overview of CUMULUS  
CUMULUS has developed an infrastructure supporting the collection and analysis of 
different types of evidence, including for example test and monitoring data for cloud 
service provision, as well as data gathered from trusted platform modules [10]. The 
developed infrastructure can be used by certification authorities to generate and man-
age digital security certificates for cloud services. It can also be used by cloud service 
providers operating at different levels of the cloud stack, i.e., cloud infrastructure, 
platform and/or software service providers for self-certification. 
The use of this CUMULUS infrastructure for different types of cloud services and 
security properties and by different types of cloud service providers is enabled 
through the specification of appropriate certification models. These models describe 
the process of collecting and analysing evidence in order to assess security properties 
and the process of creating and managing digital certificates asserting the outcomes of 
this process. More specifically, a certification model specifies: 
(i) the cloud service to be certified (i.e., the target of certification (TOC)); 
(ii) the security property  to be certified for TOC; 
(iii) the certification authority that will sign the certificates generated by the model; 
(iv) an assessment scheme that defines general conditions regarding the evidence 
that must be collected for being able to issue a certificate; 
(v) additional validity tests regarding the configuration of the cloud provider that 
must be satisfied prior to issuing certificates; 
(vi) the configurations of the agents that will be used in order to collect the evi-
dence required for generating certificates; 
(vii) the way in which the collected evidence will be aggregated in certificates (evi-
dence aggregation); and  
(viii) a life cycle model  that defines the overall process of issuing certificates. 
Our monitoring-based approach for certification has been developed as part of the 
CUMULUS infrastructure and is based on monitoring-based certification models 
(MBCM) in order to specify and drive the execution of the certification process.  Such 
models incorporate the items (i)-(viii) listed above and are specified in an XML-based 
language whose top-level structure is shown in Fig 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. – Monitoring-based Certification Model schema elements 
In the following, we introduce the elements in MBCMs, which are essential for 
understanding the realization of our approach, namely the specification of security 
properties, evidence assessment schemes and the process of certification (also known 
as life cycle model).   
3 Specification and monitoring of security properties 
In MBCMs, a TOC is specified as a concrete endpoint with a set of service inter-
faces that are offered by it to external parties (provided interfaces), and a set of inter-
faces required of external parties (required interfaces). 
The security property to be certified for TOC is specified by one monitoring rule 
and zero or more assumptions: 
Security‐property:= MonitoringRule [“,” MonitoringAssumption]* 
In a security property specification, monitoring rules are assertions expressing 
conditions that must be satisfied during the monitoring of TOC, whilst monitoring 
assumptions are assertions, which are used to record and update state variables indi-
cating the state of TOC during monitoring. Both monitoring rules and assumptions are 
expressed as assertions in EC-Assertion+. EC-Assertion+ is an extension of EC-
Assertion, i.e., the language for expressing monitoring conditions in the EVEREST 
monitoring system [26], which is part of the CUMULUS framework. EC-Assertion+ 
is based on Event Calculus [25]. Within it, assertions are formulas of the form: 
 Assertion ::= [precondition]* “⇒” postcondition 
The (optional) precondition element in an assertion determines the conditions un-
der which the assertion should be checked. The meaning of the postcondition element 
depends on whether the assertion is a monitoring rule or an assumption. In assertions 
expressing monitoring rules, postcondition determines the conditions that are guaran-
teed to hold (i.e., should be true if the preconditions are true). In assertions expressing 
monitoring assumptions, postcondition determines the states of the system that can be 
inferred to be true if the preconditions are true. 
Both monitoring rules and assumptions are defined in terms of events and fluents. 
An event is something that occurs at a specific instance of time and has instantaneous 
duration. Fluents represent system states and are initiated and terminated by events. 
The basic predicates used by EC-Assertion+ are: 
• Happens(e,t,[L,U]) – This predicate denotes that an event e of instantaneous dura-
tion occurs at some time point t within the time range [L,U]. An event e is specified 
as e(_id,_snd,_rcv,TP,_sig,_src) where _id is its unique id of it, _snd is its sender, 
_rcv is its receiver, _sig is its signature, and _src is the source where e was captured 
from.  TP denotes the type of the event. EC-Assertion+ supports three event types: 
(a) captured operation calls (REQ), (b) captured operation responses (RES) and (c) 
forced operation execution events (EXC), i.e., operation executions triggered by the 
monitor itself. EXC events constitute one of the extensions of EC-Assertion+ over 
its predecessor EC-Assertion. When such events are encountered in a formula, 
EVEREST attempts to execute the operation defined by _sig (by invoking an ex-
ternal service) and, if successful, it replaces any output parameters of the operation 
with the values produced by it and considers the relevant Happens predicate to be 
true. If the call to the external operation fails, the Happens predicate is considered 
to be false. EXC events are used to execute external computations (e.g., online 
tests) during monitoring.  
• Initiates(e,f,t) – This predicate denotes that a fluent f is initiated by an event e at 
time t. fluents are expressed as n-ary relations of the form relation(arg1, …, argn), 
where argi can be constant values or variables of basic data types. 
• Terminates(e,f,t) – This predicate denotes that a fluent f is terminated by an event e 
at time t. 
• HoldsAt(f,t) – This is a derived predicate denoting that a fluent f holds at time t. 
HoldsAt(f,t) is true if f has been initiated by some event at some time point t’ before 
t and has not been terminated by any event within [t’,t]. 
• <rel>(x,y) – These are relational predicates (<rel>::=  = | < | > | ≤ | ≥ | ≠) enabling 
comparisons between variables of basic data types, or between such variables and 
constant values. 
To demonstrate the use of EC-Assertion+ in specifying security properties, consider 
an example showing how it may be used to specify a security property included in the 
Protection Profile for Database Management Systems developed by Oracle [DBMS 
PP, 2000] (i.e., a Common Criteria (CC) profile developed for the certification of 
relational database management systems). This security property (also known as secu-
rity functional requirement or SFR in the context of CC [7]) is about the timing of 
user identification and is expressed as follows within the protection profile: 
FIA_UID.1.2:  The  TSF  shall  require  each  DATABASE  user  to  be 
successfully identified before allowing any other TSF‐mediated 
actions on behalf of that DATABASE user.  
The certification model for monitoring and certifying FIA_UID.1.2 consists of 
three assertions: two assumptions and one monitoring rule.  The two assumptions in 
the MBCM are used to initialise and terminate a fluent indicating whether a user is 
connected to the DBMS following successful authentication. The fluent is expressed 
by the relation Connected(_thread-id, _user). The meaning of the relation is that the 
user indicated by the variable _user has been connected to the DBMS through the 
thread indicated by the variable _threat-id. The fluent Connected(.) is initiated when 
an event showing the successful connection of _user to the DBMS occurs. The as-
sumption that is used to initiate the fluent is expressed as
1
: 
FIA_UID.1.2.A1 
Happens(e(_eId,_thread‐id,_host,REQ,o(_thread‐id,_query‐id, 
_queryType,_user),_SRC),_t1,R(_t1,_t1)) ∧ (_queryType = Connect) ⇒ 
Initiates(e(_eId,  _thread‐id,  _host,  REQ,  o(_thread‐id,_query‐id, 
_queryType,_user),_SRC), Connected(_thread‐id, _user),_t1) 
The above assertion monitors events of the form o(_thread-id, _query-id, 
_queryType, _user). When an event of this form occurs during the operation of the 
DBMS and the type of the query captured by the event (i.e., _queryType) is “Con-
nect”, the state Connected(.) is initiated. The events o(_thread-id, _query-id, 
_queryType, _user) required in order to operate the certification model of this exam-
ple are captured during the operation of the DBMS to be certified and are passed to 
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 For readability, we provide the specification of assertions in the high level syntax of EC-
Assertion+. EC-Assertion+ has also an XML schema used in actual monitoring. 
the CUMULUS framework by an event translator that we have developed for this 
purpose (see Sect 4). The state Connected(.) may also be terminated during the opera-
tion of a DBMS if a given user disconnects from the DBMS. The assumption that 
captures such disconnection events and updates the fluent Connected(.) is expressed 
as: 
FIA_UID.1.2.A2 
Happens(e(_eId,_thread‐id,_host,REQ,o(_thread‐id,_query‐id, 
_queryType,_user),_SRC), _t1, R(_t1, _t1)) ∧ (_queryType = Quit) ∧ 
HoldsAt(Connected(_thread‐id, _user), _t1) ⇒ 
Terminates(e(_eId,  _thread‐id,  _host,  REQ,  o(_thread‐id,  _query‐id, 
_queryType, _user), _SRC), Connected("thread‐id", "user"), _t1) 
According to above assertion, the fluent Connected(.) is terminated, when a “Quit” 
event occurs for a user, provided that at the time when the “Quit” event the particular 
user is connected. This is checked in the formula by the HoldsAt(Connected(_thread-
id, _user), _t1) condition. 
The monitoring rule assertion that is used to check if a DBMS satisfies 
FIA_UID.1.2 is expressed as: 
FIA_UID.1.2.MR1 
Happens(e(_eId,  _thread‐id,  _host,  REQ,  o(_thread‐id,  _query‐id, 
_queryType, _user), _SRC), _t1, R(_t1, _t1)) ∧ 
not (_queryType = Connect) ⇒ 
HoldsAt(Connected(_thread‐id, _user), _t1) 
The above rule monitors if at each time (_t1) when a user executes queries at the 
DB server, which are not of type “Connect”, he/she must have been successfully con-
nected to the server. Thus, the monitoring rule checks that when queries of a type 
other than “Connect” occur, the fluent Connected(_thread-id, _user), which indicates 
that the user has already established a connection to the server through the specific 
thread, holds.  
3.1 Specification and verification of assessment scheme  
The assessment scheme in a MBCM defines conditions regarding the sufficiency 
of evidence that must be collected in order to be able to issue a certificate. These con-
ditions are related to: (i) the sufficiency of the extent of the collected evidence, and 
(ii) anomalies and conflicts that should be monitored during the certification process. 
In this paper we do not discuss anomalies and conflicts but an account of them is 
available in [17]. 
Evidence sufficiency conditions may be specified as: (a) the minimum period of 
monitoring TOC, (b) the minimum number of monitoring events, and/or (c) the repre-
sentativeness of the monitoring events with respect to the expected behaviour of TOC 
that should be seen by the monitor before a certificate can be issued. Whilst the speci-
fication of (a) and (b) is straightforward, to enable checks of the representativeness of 
monitoring events, the certification model should include a specification of a model of 
the expected behaviour of TOC (i.e., an ETOCB model). This model is specified as a 
deterministic automaton with expected relative event frequencies of the form: 
ETOCB = <States, Events, sinit, PTrans, FinalStates> 
In the ETOCB specification: States is the (finite) set of TOC states that are critical for 
the monitoring process; Events is the set of all possible events the TOC may produce 
that are of interest to certification; sinit is the initial TOC state; PTrans is a finite set of 
labelled transitions between two states; and FinalStates is the set of states where the 
certification automaton terminates. PTrans includes elements of the form (os, ds, e, 
R(lpr, upr) ) where os is the origin state of the transition,  ds is the destination state of 
the transition, e is the signature of the event triggering the transition, and R(lpr,upr) is 
the range of the expected relative frequence of undertaking this transition whilst the 
system is in os (R(lpr, upr) can be: (lpr, upr), [lpr, upr), (lpr, upr] or [lpr, upr]
2
) The 
ETOCB model must satisfy some constraints. In particular: (i) e must be an element 
of Events, i.e., an event denoting the invocation (or the response produced following 
an invocation) of an operation in the provided interface of TOC; (ii) the boundaries 
lpr, upr should satisfy the conditions: 0 ≤ lpr, upr ≤ 1, and lpr ≤ upr; and (iii) ETOCB 
must be a deterministic model. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Expected System Operation Model for Monitoring-Based Certification Model 
ETOCB defines events that should be seen at different states during the 
operation of TOC (i.e., executed operations of the ToC) for the monitoring evidence 
to be sufficient. For certifying MySQL server, for example, this evidence should in-
clude executions of select, update, delete, and quit MySQL commands with specific 
frequencies. ETOCB is not required to be a complete model of TOC’s behaviour; it 
only needs to define the states and events of importance for the property to be certi-
fied.  
Fig. 2 gives an example of the ETOCB model for a relational DB server. This 
model expresses a view about the typical range of the server usage that should be 
taken into account in the certification of the server. According to it: 
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 “[“ and “]” denote a closed range at the lower and upper boundary respectively, and “(“ and 
“)” denote an open range at the lower and upper boundary respectively. 
• The first interaction with the TOC should be a connect call to it (see event of tran-
sition from InitialState to S1) since a connection to the server should be established 
before any other query occurs. Also, according to the frequency range of this tran-
sition (i.e., [1,1]), connect calls should be the only initial event in any monitoring 
event trace, for the trace to be considered valid for the purposes of certification. 
• Once a connection to the server is established, interactions with it may be requests 
for the execution of select(), update(), delete() or quit() operations (i.e., SQL que-
ries) with expected frequency ranges [0.5, 1.0), (0.0, 0.3), (0.0, 0.2), and (0.0, 0.5), 
respectively, as indicated by the relevant transitions from S1 to S1 and S2. These 
expected frequency ranges require that data retrieval events (select() queries) will 
constitute at least half of the interactions with the server but data update() and de-
lete() queries should also be seen. The model also expresses that: (a) it will be suf-
ficient for certification purposes to see an event trace with update queries up to be-
low 30% and delete queries up to below 20% of all interactions, and (b) whilst at 
S1, the user may decide to quit() (see transition from S1 to S2). Also, the lpr of the 
latter transition  (i.e., lpr > 0) reflects that an event trace must always end with a 
quit() request for it to be a valid event trace for certification. 
Table 1. Algorithm for checking compliance of event traces with ETOCB 
CheckEvent(e, state, nstate, CountES[e,state], CountS[state], valid) { 
// CountES[e,state] is the total number of occurrences of e in state 
// CountS[state] is the total number of occurrences of any event in state 
 if there is t in state.transitions such that t.event = e then { 
   CountES[e,state] = CountES[e,state] + 1; 
   CountS[state] = CountS[state] + 1; nstate = t.ds; valid = true } 
 else  
   {valid = false} 
} 
   Boolean UpdateCounts(trace){ 
   /* ValidPR[e,s] indicates the satisfaction of expected frequency range of    
      all events of all state transitions */ 
   Set CountES[e,s] to 0 for all states s and events e of its transitions; 
   Set CountS[s] to 0 for all states s; 
   Set ValidPR[e,s] to false for all states s and events e of its transitions; 
   CST = ETOCB.s0; //CST is the current state 
   NST = nil;  
   validTrace = true; 
   While not end of event trace and validTrace do { 
    e = next non processed event in trace; 
    CheckEvent(e, CST, NST, CountES[e,CST], CountS[CST], validTrace); 
 if validTrace { 
   for each t in CST.transitions do { 
    if (CountES[t.e,CST]/CountS[CST] in R(t.e.lpr, t.e.upr)) { 
      ValidPR[t.e,CST] = true} 
     } 
    CST = NST 
   } 
   return (validTrace) 
  } 
 
The existence of the ETOCB model enables the CUMULUS infrastructure to 
check if a representative sample of the behaviour of TOC has been considered before 
a certificate can be issued. The check of the coverage of ETOCB by the stream of 
TOC events that has been processed by CUMULUS is carried according to the algo-
rithm of Table 1. The algorithm UpdateCounts() in the figure checks if each next 
event in the event trace is consistent with the ordering of events in ETOCB. If it is 
not, UpdateCounts() reports the trace as invalid (as relative frequencies would not 
matter). If an encountered event is valid, UpdateCounts() updates the relative fre-
quency of it in the current state (see array CountES[e,state]). It also updates the array 
ValidPR[e,s], which indicates if the expected frequency range of the current event e 
in state s is preserved by the current relative frequencies of events. ValidPR[e,s] can 
be checked once all other sufficiency conditions (e.g., period of monitoring) are estab-
lished to check if the coverage sufficiency conditions w.r.t. ETOCB are also satisfied. 
3.2 Specification and execution of life cycle model  
The life cycle model (LCM) in a certification model defines the process by which 
certificates can be generated and managed (e.g., monitored, issued, suspended, re-
voked).  LCM is a compulsory element of a certification model as it enables a certifi-
cation authority to specify with full precision the certification process, by defining the 
different states of certificates that can be generated by the certification model and 
which events should change it. During the operation of the CUMULUS framework, 
the LCM is used to monitor on-going certification processes, determine the state at 
which they are (e.g., collecting monitoring evidence, checking validity conditions 
prior to issuing a certificate) and, depending on it, update the state of the certificate 
that may be generated by the process. 
A life cycle model (LCM) is defined as a state transition model of the form 
LCM = <sinit, States, Trans> 
In an LCM, (i) States is the finite set of states of it (a state may be an atomic state 
or a composite state specified by another embedded LCM); (ii) sinit is the initial state 
of the process; and (iii) Trans is a finite set of transitions between two states. Trans 
includes elements of the form (si, sj, e, g, a) where si is the origin state of the transi-
tion; sj is the destination state of the transition; e is the signature of the event trigger-
ing the transition; g is guard condition that must be satisfied for the transition to take 
place; and a is a set of actions that should be executed if the transition takes place. In 
an LCM, e must be an element of the provided interface of CUMULUS (e.g., the 
operation enabling the notification of monitoring events, the operation to be executed 
if the user of the framework wishes to suspend or revoke a certificate).  
An example of an LCM is shown in Fig. 3. The LCM in the figure has an initial 
state called Activated and the states InsufficientEvidence, Pre-Issued, Issued, and 
Revoked. It also has two composite states: Continuous Monitoring and Issuing. 
 Fig. 3. UML diagram of Life-Cycle Model 
According to the model, after a certificate is activated, it moves to the Insufficien-
tEvidence state, at which the monitoring evidence that is relevant to it starts getting 
accumulated. When the accumulated evidence becomes sufficient according to the 
EvidenceSufficiencyConditions specified in the MBCM, and there have been no viola-
tions of the monitoring rule that defines the security property (i.e., the security proper-
ty of the MBCM is satisfied), the certificate moves to the state Pre-Issued. At this 
state, the certification infrastructure will check if the extra validity conditions for the 
certificate type (if any) are satisfied and, if they are, the certificate will move to the 
state Issued. In this state, any interested party with appropriate authority can retrieve 
the issued certificate from the CUMULUS infrastructure. Whilst a certificate is at the 
Issuing state, monitoring continues and if a violation of the monitoring rule of the 
MBCM is detected, the certificate moves to the Revoked state at which it will no 
longer be valid and available. It should be noted, that for readability purposes, in Fig. 
3, we have used condition labels that indicate the meaning of the relevant conditions. 
In the actual specification of LCM, however, conditions are declared by their unique 
XML level IDs, which enable condition elements to be retrieved and checked against 
the evidence database of the CUMULUS infrastructure. 
The LCM of a certification model is used by the CUMULUS framework to moni-
tor the overall certification process and update the status of certificates that may be 
generated according to it. More specifically, starting from the initial state of the LCM 
the framework will process all events according to the model. This processing is 
based on the algorithm of Table 2. The events received/generated by the framework 
during the certification process are placed in a queue. An event can be a condition that 
is met (e.g., EvidenceSufficiencyCondition, aggregation period, expiration condition 
etc.). The algorithm checks if there is an event in the queue that matches an event of a 
listed transition of the current state of the LCM and if the guard condition of it (if any) 
is satisfied. When these conditions are satisfied for the specific transition, the algo-
rithm executes the actions for the transition, and sets the status of the certificate that is 
being handled by the process, to the state that the transition leads to. To check the 
conditions associated with the transitions of an LCM, the algorithm pulls regularly 
data from the database storing the monitoring evidence gathered, and checks the con-
ditions against it (e.g., see condition assertion-satisfied in the LCM of Fig. 3).  
Table 2. Algorithm of the Life Cycle Manager component 
State ChooseTransition(State curstate, EventQueue queue){  
 top = queue.head(); //returns null when queue is empty 
 trev = {t ∈ transitions(curstate): top≠null && t.event()=top}; 
 //trans matching events  
 trem = {t ∈ transitions(curstate): t.event() = ""}; //trans with no events 
 enev = {t ∈ trev: satisfied(guard(t))}; //trans with True guard & match event 
 enem = {t ∈ trem: satisfied(guard(t))}; //trans with True guard but no event 
 t = null; 
 if (enev = 0 && enem = 0){    
   if (top≠null) throw invalidEvent; //non matching event from the queue 
   else return(curstate); 
 } else if (enev ≠ 0) { //select transition with event 
    t = select (enev);  
  queue.pop(); 
} else { //select transition with True guard but no event 
    t = select (enem);  
 }  
for (a : retrieveActions(t)) { //retrieve transition actions 
   execute(a); //execute actions 
} 
return t.nextState(); //return the new state 
} 
4 Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of our monitoring-based certification approach, 
we have conducted an experiment based on a case study involving the certification of 
a real system. The system that we selected was the open source MySQL server [21]. 
Our choice was influenced by: (a) the complexity of this system, (b) the existence of a 
Protection Profile generated by Oracle that specifies security properties for such sys-
tems based on Common Criteria [9] (aka Security Functional Requirements (SFR)), 
and (c) the existence of benchmarks for creating realistic workloads for the MySQL 
server that would enable us evaluate our automated certification process in realistic 
conditions. Moreover, since our approach does not support interventions with the 
purpose of addressing or restoring security violations, we focus only on the evaluation 
criteria of the MySQL server, based on the selected Protection Profile. 
The experiment that we set up to evaluate our approach realised a certification 
process for the security functional requirement FIA_UID.1.2 for the MySQL Server, 
based on a certification model including the assertions as described in Sect. 3. We 
also used the RUBiS benchmark [24] to produce realistic workloads of events for the 
MySQL server and monitor the server for certification purposes during the execution 
of these workloads. RUBiS is an auction site prototype, similar to eBay, which im-
plements the core functionality of an auction site, i.e., selling, browsing and bidding. 
To capture events (i.e., logs of queries) from the operation of the server, we used the 
MySQL AUDIT Plugin developed by McAfee [20]. This plugin captured the logs 
created during the execution of the RUBiS workloads against the server. The events 
logged by the plugin were initially exported as .json files and subsequently parsed and 
converted into events, in the .xml format required by the CUMULUS infrastructure. 
All the different systems used in our experiment, including RUBiS, MySQL, 
EVEREST and CUMULUS were deployed on a cloud cluster involving a test-bed 
Cloud cluster equipped with four 4-core server machines each running at 2.20GHz, 
with 8GM of main memory, 450GB of disk space under Ubuntu 3.8.0. 
The basic measure that we used in order to evaluate the performance of the certifi-
cation process was the average time for making a decision about the monitoring asser-
tion formulas in the model, called decision delay or d-delay. d-delay measures the 
difference between the time point when the latest event that is needed in order to 
make a decision about the satisfaction or otherwise of a monitoring formula occurs 
(tc) and the time when following the capture and processing of the event, the monitor 
makes a decision on whether the formula is satisfied (tp), i.e., d = t!–  t!. Based on d-
delay measures for individual instances of monitoring formulas, we calculated the 
average delay in the monitoring process using following formula ave(d) = ∑d/N 
where: (i) d is the d-delay of each monitoring rule instance, and (ii) N is the total 
number of monitoring rule instances for which a decision was made. 
 
Fig. 4. – d-delay in execution of the database certification model 
The graph in Fig. 4 shows the d values for the different events of the RUBiS 
benchmark that caused monitoring rule checks in the certification model, and the 
moving average of d-delay (Ave(d)) calculated over a window of 1000 events. The 
average value of d-delay across the whole RUBiS benchmark was 384.33 millisec-
onds (standard deviation = 118.92 milliseconds). As shown in the figure, ave(d) re-
mained relatively stable throughout the execution of the benchmark, showing that 
certification results can be produced quickly following the actual events. 
 
Events Ave(d) 
[1-5000] 326.02 
[5001-
10000] 324.47 
[10001-
15000] 357.59 
[15001-
20000] 443.31 
[20001-
25000] 413.87 
[25001-
29746] 443.83 
   
Fig. 5. – Average throughput (i) and query processing time (ii) in executing the RUBIS bench-
mark on MySQL server with and without the MySQL AUDIT plugin 
Table 2. Average throughput and query execution time with and without the AUDIT plugin 
Min Throughput 
 
Average Query Processing Time 
(msecs) 
 No Plugin With plugin No plugin With plugin 
1 3688.9 3245 16.27 18.49 
2 819.9 824.7 73.18 72.75 
3 1390.9 1386.1 43.14 43.29 
4 1615 1651.1 37.15 36.34 
5 1630.4 1629.7 36.8 36.82 
6 1638.2 1636.5 36.63 36.66 
7 1630.7 1645.9 36.79 36.45 
8 1633.9 1643.9 36.72 36.5 
9 1624.4 1648.5 36.94 36.4 
10 1630.2 1619.9 36.81 37.04 
11 1630.9 1611.8 36.79 37.23 
12 1617 1646.9 37.11 36.43 
13 1638.8 1648.5 36.61 36.4 
14 1651.5 1627.3 36.33 36.87 
15 1631.3 1628 36.78 36.86 
16 1665.5 1635.4 36.03 36.69 
17 1677.4 1649.8 35.77 36.37 
18 788.2 779.6 76.12 76.96 
 
In addition to the time needed to generate certification results, the execution of a 
CUMULUS monitoring-based certification model may have an impact on the opera-
tion of TOC as it is necessary to instrument and/or configure the TOC in order to 
produce the events needed for the monitoring process that underpins certification. To 
evaluate this overhead in the case of the MySQL server, we executed the RUBiS 
benchmark without using the MySQL audit plugin in the server (case (a)) and with 
the use of the MySQL audit plugin in the server (case (b)). The overhead was esti-
mated by calculating the average throughout (i.e., the number of queries executed per 
minute) of the server in 10 different executions of case (a) and 10 different executions 
of case (b). Each of these 20 executions involved the execution of the same number of 
RUBIS queries against the server (~30,000 queries) but the queries executed in each 
execution were selected randomly by the RUBIS system. The completion of the exe-
cution of the different query sets took on average 18 minutes. 
The average throughput for cases (a) and (b) was measured per minute and the result 
is shown in the Throughput graph of Fig. 5. As shown in this graph the use of the 
MySQL AUDIT plugin had almost a very minor effect on the performance of the 
server. The same is evident from Average Execution Time graph in Fig. 5, which 
shows the average execution time per RUBIS query (in milliseconds), for every mi-
nute during the execution period. The absence of any significant effect is also evident 
from which shows the actual throughput and average query execution times for (a) 
and (b). The main difference in query execution time was observed only in the initial 
stage of the execution of each query set, when RUBiS sent queries to establish the 
connection to MySQL for each transaction thread. 
5 Related Work 
Research related to our approach includes work for service certification, cloud securi-
ty and cloud monitoring. In this section we give an overview of this work.  
Similar approaches in the field of security certification schemes focus mostly on 
concrete software components and provide self-assessed, human-readable certificates. 
As a result, these approaches cannot be integrated into dynamic service processes that 
require machine-readable certificates. Significant work on the representation and use 
of digital certificates in SOA systems was done in the FP7 Project ASSERT4SOA. 
This project developed a test-based certification of software services and a framework 
for representing and using machine-readable certificates, known as ASSERTS. 
Research on the certification of cloud services is still in an early stage. The work of 
Grobauer et al. [12], assess some vulnerabilities of cloud computing, and outlines the 
main reason of the existence of such vulnerabilities as the lack of certification 
schemes and security metrics. Heiser and Nicolett [13] have evaluated the cloud secu-
rity risks and proposed an IT risks sharing scheme. Furthermore, Anisetti et al [1] 
presented a trusted model for certifying cloud services, by delegating different dy-
namic testing mechanisms. 
A commonly used framework for cloud certification is CSA’s Cloud Controls Ma-
trix (CCM) [5]. CCM contains a comprehensive set of baseline controls to assess the 
information security assurance level of cloud providers and maps these controls to 
existing frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27001-2013, PCI DSS Cloud Guideline [23], 
COBIT [6], NIST [15], or IT Baseline Protection Catalogues [16].  
The Cloud Security Alliance has also developed and launched in 2011 the CSA 
Security, Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) Program [27], which is a third party 
independent assessment of the security of a cloud service provider. STAR is based on 
a multi-layered structure defined by Open Certification Framework (OCF) Working 
Group [8] and on the requirements of the ISO/IEC 27001 management system stand-
ard together with the CSA CCM. STAR approach consists of three different levels of 
certification. Our approach is similar to the third level of STAR, which is the CSA 
STAR Continuous Monitoring, which is meant to enable automation of auditing, as-
sessment, monitoring and certification of security practices of cloud providers.  
Cloud monitoring has been supported by several monitoring systems. Most of 
them, however, focus on monitoring performance and SLAs monitoring rather than 
security properties (e.g., [15][3]) and do not support security certification.  
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented an automated certification approach for cloud ser-
vices based on continuous monitoring. We have described the core mechanisms of our 
approach that can be used to specify and realise a certification process for the security 
of cloud services. We have also given an example showing how the approach can be 
used to realise, in an automated manner, the certification of a security property de-
fined in a Common Criteria protection profile for database systems.  
The certification model underpinning this example has been used to evaluate our 
approach as part of an experiment in which we used the MySQL server. The results of 
this evaluation showed that the certification process that we proposed can produce 
results in an automated manner, fast and without interfering significantly with the 
performance of the system that is certified. The average time complexity of the moni-
toring algorithm is N*M, where N is the average number of events and M is the aver-
age number of rule instances, at different time periods during the monitoring process. 
M depends on the number of different events in assertions and the time constraints 
between them. The average delay in checking assertions is experimentally shown not 
to be significant. Basic security properties (integrity, availability, confidentiality) can 
be expressed by assertions of such complexity as shown in the literature. Hence, our 
approach is feasible for large numbers of events. A video of a demo of the implemen-
tation of our approach is available from: http://youtu.be/HWb_dA2UCxM. 
Our on-going work focuses on a further evaluation of our approach for different 
types security properties and cloud services. We are also investigating the use of 
model checking techniques to verify statically properties of certification models. 
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